Am I Colonized Because I Read Kant?

I hope a day will not come when someone walks up to me and says that because I work on P, let’s say Immanuel Kant, I am colonized. I should not pretend the thought is far away. I have already heard versions of it, from Africans at home and from those of us in the diaspora: the African scholar who spends his life on European philosophers has somehow lost himself. Whether this is true or not is what I am still thinking through. This post is me thinking out loud, not me arriving.

Let me say early that I do not quarrel with Kant. He is only my example. I could as easily say Plato, Dewey, or Hegel, or any of the names that filled my reading lists. The question is not about one philosopher. It is about what it means for a Black, African scholar to give his attention to thinkers who did not come from where he came from.

I cannot be too hard on the person who might ask me this question, because I was once that person. When I was a student in Nigeria, I was bothered that so many of us were interested in Plato, Dewey, and Kant and their company. Why were we not thinking about our own philosophers and our own philosophies? Why weren’t we approaching education from a true sense of relationality, from the ways of knowing and being together we already carried? I remember walking up to one of my professors to ask how we could bring Léopold Senghor's Négritude, Julius Nyerere, and others back into our curriculum instead of always talking about Kant.

I still think that question was a good one. The colonial curriculum did not give us Kant as one voice among many. It gave him to us as philosophy itself, while our own thought was treated as custom, proverb, or folklore. To notice that and to be unsettled by it was not a mistake. But I have since learned something about the very figures I wanted to bring back. Senghor was trained in French philosophy and drew deeply on thinkers like Bergson. Nyerere translated Shakespeare into Swahili. The people I held up as the answer to Kant did not treat European thought as forbidden ground. They read it, wrestled with it, and bent it to their own purposes. That should have told me something.

Some time ago I attended a symposium where a white scholar presented on Ubuntu. I was, as often happens, the only African and the only Black man in the room. I will be honest. Seeing her speak on Ubuntu was a thing of joy for me. Here was a philosophy from my side of the world being taken seriously in a room where it is not often heard. I wanted to say that first, and I did, though maybe not as well as I would have liked. Then I offered my own thought that we should see Ubuntu beyond the way she had framed it and approach it from another angle as well.

Another discussant shut that conversation down. In his view, there was no need to be bothered about my own reading of Ubuntu, since I had already agreed that what the speaker said was valid. He was right that I agreed with her. But agreeing that an account is valid does not mean there is nothing more to say about it. Scholarship does not end where agreement begins. Often that is exactly where it deepens. That moment has stayed with me because it holds my question in reverse. If it is fine, even joyful, for a white scholar to work on Ubuntu, why should it be suspicious for an African scholar to work on Kant? Are the two the same?

I do not think they are the same, and I want to be careful here. Kant and others arrived in Nigeria through a colonial system that presented him as universal. Ubuntu arrived in Western rooms after a long history of being dismissed as not quite philosophy. The roads run in different directions and carry different histories of power. A white scholar on Ubuntu and an African scholar on Kant are not mirror images. But that difference is about history, not about who has the right to think. Neither of us should be told to stay in our lane. What I would ask of the white scholar on Ubuntu is what I would ask of myself on Kant. Come with humility, come in relation, and be ready to be corrected by those who live inside the tradition.

There is a harder version of the worry, and I feel it in my own reading. Can I truly understand Kant the way Kant understood himself or the way his own people do? I have spent many hours reading Western philosophers I had to present on, write about and teach, sometimes without fully grasping their theorization, sometimes assuming their world was my world when it was not. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie describes something like this in her talk on the danger of a single story. As a child, she wrote stories full of white characters who played in the snow and drank ginger beer, though she had never seen snow and did not know what ginger beer was. The books she read had taught her that stories were about people who did not look or live like her.

So is it not fair to criticize us for not speaking to our own reality? Is relationality not absent when we pour ourselves into thinkers whose world was so different from ours? I have come to think the answer is more complicated. No one understands Kant like Kant, not even Germans today. Everyone reads him across a distance of time, language and world. Every reader brings a horizon. Mine is Yoruba, Nigerian, and perhaps Canadian too. That horizon is not a gap in my understanding. It is what I bring to the table. I may notice things in Kant that his own people never thought to ask. This is not new. Emmanuel Eze exposed the racism in Kant’s writings on race and anthropology. Charles Mills argued for a Black radical Kantianism, taking Kant’s ideals of dignity and respect and turning them against Kant’s own exclusions. Neither of them was colonized by Kant. They read him from where they stood, and Kant has been read differently ever since.

Here is what I now think Adichie’s point really was. The problem was not that she read British stories. The problem was that she had only British stories, so she could not imagine that people like her could live in books. The danger is the single story, not the story. If that is right, then colonization is not about which books are on your desk. It is about whether you were given only one kind of book and told it was the only kind that mattered. It is about whether you can choose, question, and talk back.

And this is where the diaspora surprises me. Here, when someone with your skin sees you in an academic space, the assumption is that you are working on something about your people. It may be easy to find work on Black joy and on the experiences of Africans, Black Canadians, Jamaicans, and many others. This work is precious and needed. But when the expectation becomes that a Black scholar must do this work and that doing anything else is a kind of betrayal, we have built another single story. This one comes with good intentions, but it still tells us where we belong.

So I find myself in a strange position. In Nigeria, I worried that I was colonized for reading too much of the West. In the diaspora, I am told the same thing for the same reading, only now the reason is my skin. If I was not colonized in Nigeria, how can I suddenly become colonized here by reading the same books? I do not have a neat ending, but I have arrived at a place I can stand.

Even if I was colonized in Nigeria, I would rather say I am on a journey of discovery. Reading Plato, Kant, or Dewey does not make me colonized. Reading them as if they were the only voices worth hearing would. Reading Senghor, Nyerere, and Ubuntu does not automatically make me free either if I read them only because I am expected to. What matters is not the name on the book but how I come to it, in relation, with critique, and by choice.

I want to be the kind of scholar who can sit with Kant and with Senghor at the same table, let them argue, and add my own voice. I want to welcome the white scholar who takes Ubuntu seriously and then disagree with her generously. And I want us, especially in the diaspora, to stop asking African scholars to prove their belonging through their reading lists. I am still thinking. But I no longer believe that the question “Are you colonized because you work on Kant?” has a simple yes-or-no answer.

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